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The Democratic Deficit and School-based Management in Australia 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose 
The theory of the democratic deficit is applied to school-based management with an 
emphasis on Australia. This theory was developed to examine managerial 
restructuring of the Australian Public Service in the 1990s. Given similarities between 
the use of managerial practices in the public service and government schools, we draw 
on recent literature about school-based management in Australia and apply the 
democratic deficit theory to it.  
 
Design 
This paper is conceptual in focus. We analyse literature in terms of the three 
components of the democratic deficit—the weakening of accountability, the denial of 
the roles and values of public employees, and the emergence of a ‘hollow state’ 
(Rhodes, 1994) — and in relation to the application of this theory to the Australian 
Public Service.   
 
Findings 
A trend towards the three components of the democratic deficit is evident in Australia 
although, to date, its emergence has not been as extensive as in the United Kingdom. 
We argue that the democratic principles on which public schooling in Australia was 
founded are being eroded by managerial and market practices.  
 
Practical implications 
These findings provide policy makers and practitioners with another way of 
examining managerial and market understandings of school-based management and 
its impact on teachers and on students. It offers suggestions to reorient practices away 
from those that are exclusively managerial based towards those that are public sector 
based.  
 
Originality/value 
The value of this paper is that it applies the theory of the democratic deficit to current 
understandings of school-based management.  
 
Classification 
Research paper 
 
Keywords: democratic deficit, accountability, school-based management 
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The Democratic Deficit and School-based Management in Australia 
 
Introduction 
Throughout the world the public sector is in crisis. A significant aspect of this crisis is 
a failure, or potential failure, to deliver social outcomes and the de-professionalisation 
of public employees. It is heightened by the privatisation of public goods and 
services, and the redefinition of citizens as customers. In schools, managerial-inspired 
policies impose greater contractual accountability on principals, at the expense of 
professional and moral accountabilities. In this paper, we are not denying that there 
are multiple forms of accountability and that different types of accountability are 
appropriate in certain situations (Jones, 1992; Martin, 1997; Mulgan, 2000a, 2000b; 
Pillay and Kimber, 2009; Uhr, 1999). Our argument is that contractual accountability 
driven by the market is problematic for public activities such as schooling.1 The 
reason is that it can de-professionalise teachers through a performance focus, and 
attempts to impose market relationships on public schools through a stress on parental 
(customer) choice of schools, ignoring that that choice is limited by complex factors 
including parental income.  
 
Australia in the 1990s and 2000s has seen the appearance of a ‘democratic deficit’ 
(Kimber and Maddox, 2003; Costello in Preston, 1998) in the public service. This 
deficit highlights the weakening of professional accountability, the ignoring of the 
roles and values of public employees, and the emergence of a ‘hollow state’ (Rhodes, 
1994). The hollow state has been described as the removal of public goods and 
services from the public sector and the reduction of citizens to customers or clients 
                                                 
1 See Alford, 1993; Harden, 1992; Pollitt, 1988; Rhodes, 1994; Ranson and Stewart, 1994; and Thynne, 
1994 for a discussion of public goods.  
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(Rhodes, 1994). In this paper, we argue that we are witnessing the development of 
this deficit in the schooling system, and its emergence is in part a consequence of the 
current managerial and market understanding of school-based management. We 
contend that contractual accountability, referred to as ‘the degree to which [actors] … 
are fulfilling their expectations of particular audiences in terms of standards, 
outcomes and results’ (Mulford et al., 2008, p. 20) might be strengthened but 
professional and moral accountability are being weakened. It is argued that the focus 
on contractual accountability and performance is de-professionalising teachers and 
has the potential to reduce outcomes for students. The marketisation — or 
privatisation — of schools is at the expense of those who are unable to pay, 
privatising public education and conflicting with the notions of the school system as 
free, compulsory and secular.  
 
In this article first we consider the democratic deficit in the public service and then 
apply this theory to schools. While the situation in Australia might not be as grave as 
in the United Kingdom, the recent launching of the federal government’s MySchools 
website that provides school results on national literacy and numeracy tests, and 
compares these results with statistically similar schools (thus establishing League 
Tables) represent the onward march of the democratic deficit. This discussion 
emphasises the public values of democratic citizenship such as community, 
deliberative discussion, inclusion, and social justice rather than the values of the 
market such as the individual, customers, exclusion, and performance.  
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The Democratic Deficit 
The theory of the democratic deficit was developed as a response to the argument 
posited by those advocating managerial restructuring of the public sector. Briefly, the 
proponents of the managerial position argue that the use of private sector management 
practices within the public service will: strengthen accountability; improve efficiency 
by developing a performance focus; and clarify accountability lines, thus inculcating a 
customer focus. Together, these practices are believed to enhance democratic 
government (e.g., Kimber, 1999, 2000; Kimber and Maddox, 2003).  
 
Managerialism, which is also termed corporate managerialism, New Public 
Management, and economic rationalism, was introduced into the public sector in 
many countries following the Oil Shock of the 1970s. Simply, managerialism entails 
the introduction of private sector practices into the public sector and the removal of 
public goods and services to the private sector.  
 
Proponents of managerialism bring together the neo-classical economic theories of 
public choice theory, agency theory, and transaction cost analysis with the 
management theory, New Public Management.2 Beliefs in individualism and in the 
free market are central to proponents of these theories. These ideas can be thought of 
as having been built on a particular reading of the work of Adam Smith3, and on the 
work of the utilitarians, James Mill and Jeremy Bentham (Borins, 1988; Boston, 
1991; Dietrich, 1994; Dinwiddy, 1989; Dunleavy, 1991; Ferlie, et al., 1996; 
Groenewegen, 1996; Head and Bell, 1994; Holmes and Shand, 1995; Hood, 1991; 
                                                 
2 It has been argued that the British television series, Yes Minister, is based on public choice theory 
(Borins, 1988; Wettenhall, 1997, p. 238).  
 
3 It can be argued that this neo-classical economic understanding of Smith ignores the spirit of 
beneficence in his work.  
 5
Kettl, 1993; McMaster and Sawkins, 1996; Mueller, 1984[1976]: Orchard, 1989; 
Pollitt, 1993; PUMA, 1993; Pusey, 1991; Reglar, 1999; Savoie, 1995; Self, 1990, 
1993; Shafritz and Hyde, 1987; Stretton and Orchard, 1994; Trebilcock, 1995; 
Worsham et al., 1997; Williamson, 1996, Waldo, 1984). Writers such as James 
Buchanan (1984 [1979]) and former head of the Australian Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, Michael Keating (1989, 1990) have been some of the 
proponents of these theories. While managerial practices might have increased 
efficiency and highlighted the importance of contractual accountability, in 
Government Business Enterprises for instance, when introduced into core public 
services often they have been at the expense of competing values such as equity and 
effectiveness. Our key concern in this article, then, is the erosion of democratic 
principles in public education by managerial and market forces.   
 
This erosion can be viewed through ‘three paradoxical results of managerial 
restructuring’ that have been observed in Westminster-type democracies (Kimber and 
Maddox, 2003, p. 62). Westminster-type democracies such as those operating in the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, are systems of representative 
and responsible parliamentary government. The first of these results is that, rather 
than strengthening accountability, the use of managerial practices weakens it 
(Considine, 1988, 1990, 1996; Gregory, 1999; Kelsey, 1993, 1995; Kimber and 
Maddox, 2003; Maor, 1999; Mascarenhas, 1993). The second is that, when they have 
been used inappropriately, private sector performance practices have led to ‘the denial 
of time-honoured roles and values of the public service arising from an inappropriate 
use of private sector performance practices’ (Kimber and Maddox, 2003, p. 62). 
Third, rather than clarifying accountability lines and serving citizens better, some 
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writers have observed the emergence of a ‘hollow state’ (Rhodes, 1994) where public 
goods and services have been removed from the public sector, and citizens have been 
redefined as customers or clients (e.g., Ferlie et al., 1996; Pierre, 1995; Seidle, 1995). 
‘Together, these three outcomes can be described as the democratic deficit position’ 
(Kimber and Maddox, 2003, p. 62). Each of these components is now discussed.  
 
The weakening of accountability 
 
For those advancing the democratic deficit position, accountability is weakened as a 
consequence of managerialists’ denial of the political nature of public management. 
By seeking to establish a strict separation between politics and administration, 
proponents of the managerial perspective misconstrue the fact that ‘the concept of 
ministerial responsibility in Westminster-type governments renders any redefinition 
of that relationship increasingly difficult’ (Mascarenhas, 1993, p. 322), a point 
suggested more recently by Mulgan (2006). The effects of seeking to separate politics 
from administration in systems of representative and responsible parliamentary 
government are contradictory (Kimber and Maddox, 2003). By emphasising generic 
management skills, managers gain in power over elected ministers thus diminishing 
ministerial responsibility, especially as ‘ministers are elected for their political rather 
than their managerial capabilities’ (Kimber and Maddox, 2003, p. 62). It is likely that, 
as generic managers have minimal substantive knowledge of their department, their 
advice is not based on those substantive departmental functions (Considine, 1988, pp. 
9-11, 15-16; 1996, pp. 29-50). 
 
While seeking to increase the power of generic managers, the political executive has 
been reinforcing what can be thought of as ‘the central tenet of responsible 
government, namely that public servants are accountable to their ministers’ (Kimber 
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and Maddox, 2003, p. 62) by altering the employment and promotion process. 
Governments have, for instance, introduced senior executive services, placed 
department heads on fixed-term contracts, and made greater use of ministerial offices.  
These actions have made ‘the position of senior officers personally dependent on the 
favour of ministers’ potentially compromising the very ‘conditions that enable public 
servants to provide ministers with impartial advice in a “frank and fearless” manner’ 
(Kimber and Maddox 2003, p. 62). Referring to the process of ‘ministerialisation’ in 
the schooling system in Australia, McInerney (2003, pp. 63-65) paints a picture 
similar to that drawn by the heads of government departments and critics of 
managerial restructuring of the way in which managerial practices have increased 
politicisation and engendered a ‘climate of fear’ within the public service (Ehrich et 
al., 2004; Kimber, 2004; Kimber and Maddox, 2003). 
 
Denial of the roles and values of the public service 
It could be argued that, from the perspective of those promoting managerial solutions, 
‘Reward (and discipline) measures such as performance pay and efficiency reviews 
are held to engender business-style responses on the part of individual public 
servants’ (Kimber and Maddox, 2003, p. 62). For these people, the private sector is 
more efficient. By contrast, from the point of view of those advocating the democratic 
deficit position, some activities can be performed more efficiently in the private sector 
but others are performed more efficiently in the public sector. While the use of private 
sector practices might increase efficiency when they are used in Government Business 
Enterprises, for instance, when measures such as performance indicators and 
performance pay are used in the public service then the essentially political nature of 
the public service can be denied. Much of the activity in which public servants are 
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engaged is qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. Thus it cannot be easily 
measured (e.g., Kettl, 1995; Mashaw, 1996; Self, 1977[1972]).  
 
From the democratic deficit perspective, those promoting the managerial argument 
ignore that public servants are often motivated by factors other than higher pay. 
Indeed, public servants often cite public duty as a key motivating factor in their work 
(Kimber, 2000; Ranson and Stewart, 1994; Wettenhall, 1994). For many public 
servants, if they are to advise ministers in a ‘frank and fearless’ manner, they must 
perform their duties in the public interest and they must act ethically. As stated in the 
Principles of Good Practice (2008) released by the Institute of Public Administration 
Australia (Queensland Division), ‘values and ethics are important in establishing the 
ethos of the public sector and in effectively delivery services to the public’. These 
ethical values include integrity, fairness, and respect (IPAA, 2008).  
 
The rise of the hollow state 
When we think about the work of public servants we think about their serving citizens 
through the provision of public goods and services like health, education, and 
infrastructure. Proponents of managerial restructuring assert that separating policy 
formulation from service delivery and calling citizens customers will clarify 
accountability lines and will inculcate a customer focus, thus enhancing service. Yet, 
by separating policy formulation from service delivery, proponents of managerialism 
can remove public goods and services through methods such as contracting out  and 
privatisation. They can redefine citizens as customers or clients, thus reducing citizen 
voice and attempting to replace it with a market relationship between buyers and 
sellers. The result is a ‘hollow state’ (e.g., Rhodes, 1994). Rather than being clarified, 
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accountability lines can be blurred in the resulting network of contracts. Customer 
exit from the market does not equate with the rights and responsibilities of citizenship 
(Hirschmann, 1970). In generating a hollow state, managerialists attempt to take the 
political out of the public sector, ignoring the distinctiveness of public administration 
in the process (Kimber, 2000).  
 
The Australian Public Service, Managerial Restructuring and the Democratic Deficit 
Kimber and Maddox (2003) and Kimber (1999,2000) have explored many of the 
changes to the Australian Public Service during the period of the Keating Labor 
Government (1991-1996) in Australia through the lens of the democratic deficit. 
These initiatives included the formalisation of contract employment for the heads of 
public service departments and increased use of ministerial staff raising the spectre of 
politicisation of the public service, the use of performance indicators and performance 
pay for senior staff in areas where public service activity is qualitative rather than 
quantitative; and the contracting-out of public goods and services, as well as the 
terming of citizens as customers and clients. While there was a move towards each 
component of the democratic deficit, it was moderated by an adherence to the 
principles of representative and responsible parliamentary government (Kimber, 
2000).  
 
The more ideologically committed a government is to managerial practices the more 
marked the democratic deficit will be (e.g., Kimber and Maddox, 2003). It has been 
argued that, under the Howard Government, politicisation of the public service 
increased, as exemplified by the Children Overboard Affair and the allegations of 
whistleblower, Andrew Wilkie. During this time, public goods like Telstra were 
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privatised. Some commentators have observed that the Rudd Government has, to 
some extent, pulled back from the ideological commitment of its predecessor.  
  
School-based management 
During the 1980s, schools, as public sector organisations, became targets of reform 
processes by governments in an attempt to make them more efficient and effective 
(Dudley and Vidovich, 1995). These changes targeted the management of education 
and a previously centralised system was restructured so that schools evolved into self 
managing units (Beare and Sturman, 1991). The model introduced became known as 
‘site-based decision-making’, ‘school-centred forms of education’, ‘local school 
management’, ‘school-based management’ (McInerney, 2003, p. 57) and ‘devolution 
of responsibility’ (Commonwealth Schools Commission, 1973) 
 
School-based management has come to mean different things in different countries 
and even different states and territories in Australia. As Lingard, Hayes and Mills 
(2000) remind us, school-based management has no ‘essential meaning’ but needs to 
be understood within a particular timeframe and a particular politics. Yet a key 
assumption on which it is based is that consistent and significant delegation is 
allocated to the school level of authority to make decisions within a broader 
framework of government guidelines and policies (Caldwell and Spinks, 1992).  
 
Various studies have sought to examine the scope and impact of school-based 
management around the world (e.g., Caldwell, 2008, 2006; Cranston et al., 2003; De 
Grauwe, 2004; Gammage, 2008; World Bank, 2007; Watson, 2004). While some 
studies have focused on school leaders’ perceptions of changes under school-based 
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management (see Caldwell 2008; Cranston et al., 2003; Blackmore, 2004), others 
have sought to determine if any links can be made between school-based management 
and improved school outcomes. Regarding the former, Caldwell (2008) refers to the 
findings of several surveys on the principalship that demonstrate principals’ 
preferences to work in a self-managing school rather than under a more centralised 
system. The research of Cranston et al. (2003) illustrates Caldwell’s point. The 
authors found that over 80% of Australian and New Zealand secondary principals 
were satisfied with their role under school-based management, despite the fact that 
pressure in the role and hours worked per week had intensified.    
 
Because different approaches to school-based management have been adopted by 
different states and territories in Australia, and by different countries since the 1970s, 
it becomes problematic to consider the impact on student outcomes. Although stating 
that school-based management is changing, Caldwell (2008), a key proponent of 
school-based management, holds up Finland (a social democracy) as an example of 
successful school-based management. Many commentators would argue that the 
social democratic version of school-based management brought positive changes to 
schooling in Australia (e.g., McInerney, 2003). Yet it is not the social democratic 
version of school-based management that is at issue here. It is the managerial and 
market versions that are.  
 
De Grauwe (2004) observes that multiple and complex pre-conditions and systems are 
required for school-based management to work. While acknowledging that Finland is 
a country in which school-based management has been successful, De Grauwe (2004) 
reminds us that there are differences between developed and developing countries, 
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that there has been a negative impact on principals (including a reduction in the 
number of women in such positions), and that there is no conclusive evidence that 
school-based management has had a positive impact on teaching and learning. Watson 
(2004), who has provided a positive report on school-based management in the 
Australian Capital Territory, concludes that there is no evidence that school-based 
management has been beneficial to Australian Capital Territory students.  
 
Similarly, a World Bank (2007) study of school-based management across the globe, 
found that there were few ‘rigorous studies of the impact of’ school-based 
management and ‘those studies that had access to standardized test scores present 
mixed evidence about the impact of SBM’ (World Bank, 2007). In an analysis of 76 
empirical studies, Leithwood and Menzies (1998, p. 235) concluded that ‘The little 
evidence that does exist [about school-based management] suggests that effects on 
students are just as likely to be negative as positive’. In summary, there is no concrete 
evidence to support the contribution of school-based management towards improved 
student outcomes and, in its current managerial iteration, school-based management is 
highly contested and its advantages are yet to be realised.  
 
Of concern in this paper is the particular version of school-based management that is 
currently being embraced in Westminster-type democracies such as Australia. Rizvi 
(1994) contrasts the ‘social democratic view of devolution’ or school-based 
management that was identified in the policy discourse in the 1970s under Australia’s 
Commonwealth Schools Commission (1973) with the ‘corporate managerialist’ view 
of school-based management evident in the 1980s and beyond. According to Rizvi 
(1994), the corporate managerialist view uses the rhetoric of a socially democratic 
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view of school-based management but affords schools and their communities only an 
instrumental say over decisions. Hence, this view steers schools towards centrally 
dictated goals by tightening accountability measures (Rizvi, 1994). This outcome 
exemplifies one of the paradoxical results of managerialism identified by Considine 
(1988) more than two decades ago.  
 
In its current iteration in Australia, then, school-based management is based on 
similar managerial principles as those evident in the restructured public sector 
emphasising outputs, performance, and other efficiencies (e.g., Dempster et al., 2001; 
Lingard et al., 2002; McInerney, 2003). Thus it is contended in this paper that the lens 
provided by the democratic deficit can be used to interpret key features of school-
based management as it is currently implemented in Australia.  
 
The concerns raised by researchers such as Dempster (2000), McInerney (2003), and 
Blackmore (2004) are similar to those raised by those critical of managerial 
restructuring of the public service referred to earlier (e.g., Considine, 1988, 1990; 
Gregory, 1999; Kelsey, 1993, 1995; Kimber and Maddox, 2003; Maor, 1999; 
Macarenhas, 1993; Ranson and Stewart, 1994; Rhodes, 1994; Wettenhall, 1994). 
These concerns relate to the domination of the contractual accountability regime to 
the detriment of other forms of accountability such as professional and moral 
accountability (Ehrich, 2000). The danger here is that:  
contractual accountability denies the human and responsive dimensions of 
leadership [unlike professional and moral accountability that] centre around 
relationships between people; relationship built on trust and support, not 
relationships that are characterised by control and hierarchy (Ehrich, 2000, p. 
121).  
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While we concur with Mulford et al. (2008) that some form of contractual 
accountability in schooling is important, a heavy reliance on testing, performativity, 
and other forms of centralised control may not lead necessarily to improving 
educational outcomes or more importantly, the life chances of all children.   
 
It could be argued that, just as public servants see the value of the principles of 
representative and responsible parliamentary government ensuring that they provide 
ministers with impartial and expert advice and that they serve the public good, so too 
do teachers and school leaders attach significance to notions of professional 
accountability (Ehrich, 2000). These notions of accountability and the public good run 
counter to the emphasis on a narrow understanding of contractual accountability in the 
current managerial context in which solutions based on neo-liberal economic theories 
and the New Public Management predominate (Kimber, 2001).  
 
Blackmore (2004, p. 368) summarises this context when she says, ‘neo-liberal market 
individualism and strategies of marketisation, devolution, choice and privatization of 
education provision also came to be the dominant paradigm of global education policy 
communities of the OECD during the 1990s’. These changes can be viewed as 
marking a move away from the view that public funding of education is for the 
common good, and reinforces the notion of the increasing commodification of 
education.  
 
Weakening accountability 
As much as the use of managerial practices in the public sector generated new and 
competing forms of accountabilities, so too has the use of these practices in schools 
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(e.g., Burke, 1997; Ehrich, 2000). Like the democratic critics of New Public 
Management, those critical of school-based management:  
 
argue that the values underpinning managerialism and school-based management 
are opposed to the traditional understanding of education as a public good. These 
writers maintain that the focus on management arising from economic rationalist/ 
managerialist thinking is inconsistent with the professional and personal values of 
school leaders and can contradict important ethics of care and justice. When 
contractual accountability, that is accountability to the government or system, is 
strong and competes against moral and professional accountabilities … a skilful 
administrator needs to optimise his or her most valued beliefs, responsibilities and 
obligations in ways that minimise adverse consequences (Cranston et al., 2003, 
pp. 136-137).  
 
Such adverse consequences include the downplaying of equity and social justice, and 
the promotion of power and status (e.g., Blackmore, 2004; Blackmore and Sachs, 
2007; Preston and Samford, 2002). For instance, in a study that explored the 
experiences of 150 women leaders in schools, universities, and further education 
colleges regarding their work within an increasingly corporatised system, Blackmore 
and Sachs (2007) found that the women leaders struggled between their ‘passion for 
education’ and social justice, and the desire to perform effectively according to a 
range of external measurements:  
 
inwardly many [women leaders] perceived the performative aspects of reform as 
subverting not improving student learning, staff well-being and more equitable 
outcomes. Outwardly, they maintained appearances by being in a constant state 
of improvement and performativity as their personal (and institutional) survival 
depended on such performances (Blackmore and Sachs, 2007, p. 247). 
 
Given the ongoing marketisation and managerialism inherent in education, the authors 
question whether the current context will allow women managers the space to 
undertake the democratic work needed ‘to moderate the worst aspects of the reform 
imperatives’ (Blackmore and Sachs, 2007, p. 262). 
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In her earlier work where she analysed restructuring of the school system in Victoria, 
Blackmore (2004) observed that issues of gender and power have been marginalised 
due to work intensification and the stress on the role of principals as managers. These 
twin factors have enhanced the power of male principals, discouraged women from 
taking on the principalship, and placed ‘feminist principals’ in a situation of conflict 
between their beliefs and the system requirements (Blackmore, 2004. Also see 
McInerney, 2003).  
 
By devolving more management functions to school principals, those promoting 
managerial practices in schools accord greater weight to generic management skills 
than they do to substantive knowledge of educational leadership. This stress on 
generic management skills has been redefining the role of principals in ‘instrumental 
ways in line with their role as business managers, rather than as educational leaders’ 
(McInerney, 2003, p. 66), a point also highlighted by Dempster (2000), Blackmore 
(2004) and Ball (2009). These ‘generic concepts … at the organisational level have no 
specificity to education or schools’ (Ball, 2009, p. 87). The stress on private sector 
business factors has been de-professionalising school leaders (e.g., Hargreaves, 2000). 
The principals and teachers interviewed by Blackmore (2004) often returned to their 
feeling that their professionalism was being undermined (also see McInerney 2003).  
 
What these outcomes suggest is that the proponents of school-based management 
have, in effect, sought to strengthen principals’ and teachers’ contractual 
accountability to governments (Ehrich, 2000). Yet they have also weakened the 
professional and moral accountability (Ehrich, 2000) that principals have to their 
teacher colleagues and to their students. These accountabilities hinge on the ethics of 
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care, of critique, and of justice (Starratt, 1996), and on the professionalism of 
teachers. The next part of the discussion considers some of the problematic aspects of 
contractual accountability for teachers’ roles and work. 
 
Denial of the roles and values of teachers 
It is not in dispute that, in Australia, ‘over the past forty years, school-based 
management has brought benefits to school systems in terms of decreasing the highly 
structured and rigid nature of education’ (McInerney, 2003, p. 69). For example, 
proponents have identified advantages as greater contractual accountability of 
schools; the ability of schools to make decisions about resources; and the ability to 
draw on the professional capacities of staff (Leithwood and Menzies, 1998). 
However, as noted early, in its current managerial iteration, school-based 
management is contested and its advantages are yet to be realised. 
 
Central to this second dimension of the democratic deficit is a performance focus to 
the detriment of the traditional roles and values of public servants — or, in this case, 
teachers and school leaders. Hargreaves (2000) argues that we are in an age of de-
professionalism that has been driven by globalisation, technology and the need for 
international competitiveness. The performance focus of this era is evident in the 
stress on ‘returning teachers to the hands-on intuitive, learn-as-you-go approach of the 
pre-professional age or by subjecting them to the detailed measurement and control of 
narrowly conceived competence frameworks; or both’ (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 167). It 
is evident in centralised curricula and testing regimes that reduce the autonomy of 
classroom teachers and contain a ‘market-inspired application from the corporate 
sector, of systems of administration by performance management (through targets, 
 18
standards, and paper trails of monitoring and accountability)’ (Hargreaves, 2000, pp. 
168-169). 
 
A key aspect of the performance focus is performance pay. Performance pay is based 
on the public choice theory assumption that workers are motivated by higher pay 
(e.g., Buchanan, 1984 [1979]; Orchard, 1989; Self, 1990, 1993; Stretton and Orchard, 
1994). As noted above, it was argued by those introducing managerial reform into the 
public service that public servants were motivated by higher pay. Yet it was found by 
those critical of the changes that many public servants were motivated by serving the 
public and not by higher pay.  
 
In Australia during the period of the Keating Government the implementation of 
performance pay in the Australian Public Service failed because it caused angst and 
because senior public servants refused to accept private sector performance practices 
as central to greater efficiency, accountability, and democracy. They viewed the 
public service as a unified career service, with roles and values such as sense of duty 
that were distinct from those of the private sector (Kimber, 2000; Halligan, 1997, 
1994).  
 
During the final years of the Howard Government, there was discussion about 
implementing a performance pay scheme for teachers (e.g., Ingvarson et al., 2007). 
Similar criticisms to performance pay for public servants can be mounted against 
performance pay for teachers, particularly in relation to professionalism. Ingvarson et 
al. (2007) argued that any performance pay scheme needs to be devised jointly by the 
government, professional associations and employer organisations. Teachers needed 
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to develop the standards by which teachers’ knowledge and skills would be assessed. 
They proposed a national trial scheme involving primary school teachers, and 
secondary mathematics and science teachers. 
 
While all stakeholders argue that teachers should be appropriately remunerated and 
are currently underpaid, there is disagreement over performance pay. The call for 
performance pay has been supported by the Business Council of Australia and the 
Australian Industry Group (Milburn, 2007) but regarded with suspicion by unions 
(Milburn, 2007). The Australian Council of Trade Unions president, Sharon Burrow, 
has described performance pay as an ‘insult to the teaching profession’ as it ‘would 
demoralise teachers by pitting them against one another’ (Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2007). Some teachers would be disadvantaged as the need ‘to balance 
the books’ implied that ‘some teachers would not get their annual increment leaving 
them worse off than under the current pay structure’ (Australian Education Union, 
Victoria, 2007, 
http://www.aeuvic.asn.au/campaigns/federal_public_education/news/1179374173_20
845.html). 
 
The then Australian Education Union federal president, Pat Byrne 
(http://www.aeufederal.org.au/Media/MediaReleases/2007/1206.pdf), observed that 
‘“Performance pay has failed everywhere it has been tried overseas and even the 
Minister’s own research found it would not work and points out the pitfalls associated 
with linking pay to student results”’.4 Importantly, the judging of teachers via their 
students’ results indicates that the systems’ advocates ignore the socio-economic 
                                                 
4 For instance, performance pay was trialled in the United States in the early 1990s.  
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backgrounds of students (Martin, 2007).  While the performance pay scheme in the 
Australian Public Service failed in its implementation, the performance pay scheme 
for teachers did not even reach the implementation stage. It was not only rejected by 
State and Territory ministers (April 2007) because it interfered in their responsibilities 
for schooling but was unable to be funded by the Commonwealth (Australian 
Education Union, Victoria, 2007). 
 
As the performance focus in public schooling in Australia has intensified, it has been 
reported that the altered role of principals, the changes to teaching jobs and the attack 
on teachers’ unions, it has been reported that some teachers have come to feel so 
devalued that they have been considering whether they wish to remain in the 
profession (e.g., Blackmore, 2004). Thus teachers and principals, like public servants, 
are motivated by many goals including professionalism and service — and not purely 
by personal financial gain.  
 
Questions of schools, teachers, and performance management have been addressed in 
the United Kingdom. Gleeson and Husbands (2003), for instance, appear to argue that 
performance management does not improve the quality of teaching as it is counter-
productive. They link questions about professionalism and pedagogy to modernism. 
Gleeson and Husbands (2003, p. 500) argue ‘that modernization is not primarily or 
necessarily concerned with education improvement, but with the changing conditions 
of performance in which professionality and pedagogy occur’.  
 
Connecting with Hargreaves’ (2000) observations noted earlier, market and 
managerial reformers have sought to alter ‘professional and managerial cultures away 
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from public policy narratives, to those based on private market principles’ (Gleeson 
and Husbands, 2003, p. 501). Through the use of performance management, appraisal, 
target setting, standards, and funding reformers have ‘constrained the identities, 
responsibilities, and working conditions of professionals in public sector’ (Gleeson 
and Husbands, 2003, p. 501). The use of private sector performance practices and 
working conditions via deregulation, contracting out and ‘the indirect privatisation of 
the public sector’ are seen to undermine ‘values in the public domain’ (Gleeson and 
Husbands, 2003, p. 502).  
 
The focus shifts from the citizen to the individual in this market system. Individuals 
are expected to invest more in their education and performance. The concerns of the 
education system could be seen as moving from the welfare of citizens to:  
enhancing positional status. This shift has changed the relationship between 
individual and society in the way rights, duties, and responsibilities have become 
more and more contractually mediated through education. Performativity ensures 
that both the conditions of the market and the terms of its compliance are adhered 
to, in formal and in tacit ways. … Increasingly, what counts as an educated person 
us being normalised by tests and measures of social order (skill, outcome, and 
targets) which have only a tenuous grip on citizenship, morality, and employability 
despite expressed concerns for the latter. … (Gleeson and Husbands, 2003, p. 504).  
 
Gleeson and Husbands (2003, p. 505) see two key policy assumptions regarding ‘the 
relationship between performance management policies and school-level 
management’. These two key assumptions are about a technical view of teaching that 
delivers predetermined outcomes. Teachers and school leaders are redirected to:  
 
focus on the short-term and measurable, the system as a whole has been realigned 
around new managerial assumptions. … Both assumptions derive from a reading 
of the influence of the New Right …. Performance management becomes an 
inspection and compliance framework by other routes, in which the 
delivery/technician model of teaching and school management is trained by 
deployed in different directions. We have already seen that performance 
management frameworks are dependent upon policy prescriptions of the intended 
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outcomes of teaching: in this respect they make assumptions about the purposes of 
schooling … this narrow focus is open to systematic doubt. Critiques of 
performance management cut its capacity to deprofessionalize and de-skill teachers 
in a search for models of technical effectiveness is a persistent feature. … 
programmes based on the functional analysis of  work roles are likely to produce 
teachers who are judged competent but are ill-equipped for further professional 
development, uncritical of education change and largely ignorant of the wider 
cultural, social, and political context. (Gleeson and Husbands, pp. 505-506). 
 
In Australia, Perry and McWilliam (2007, p. 32) have observed that, in the current 
policy milieu, ‘schools must be seen to perform, and to perform in ways that are 
measurable and thus are rendered visible to all’. Perry and McWilliam (2007) argue 
that converting almost everything to what is quantitative or measurable is to the 
detriment of the activities of teaching and learning that are qualitative and not highly 
visible such as the social, aesthetic, cultural, moral, spiritual, intellectual, innovative, 
and creative aspects of students’ development. Under this performance rubric, 
students are reduced to a number such as a tertiary entrance score, and teachers focus 
on preparing students for standardised tests to the exclusion of these other educational 
objectives. Such a performance focus is counterproductive as it can erode the trust 
that is essential not only for the teaching profession but also for any accountability 
system (Perry and McWilliam, 2007. Also see Gleeson and Husbands, 2003).  
 
In summary, during the period of the Howard Government in Australia, the 
professionalism of teachers was under attack. That a performance pay scheme was not 
implemented could indicate recognition that higher pay is not necessarily a motivating 
factor for teachers. Federalism also played a factor in the mitigation of the federal 
government’s scheme because it represented an attempt by the federal government to 
intervene in what are traditionally state government responsibilities in Australia. 
Nonetheless, all state governments have pursued school-based management to some 
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degree. The development of a national curriculum is well advanced, as is the use of 
standardised testing. It is important for the professionalism of teachers to be 
continually reasserted and the values of the public domain be stressed. An emphasis 
on these values is critical to counter the effects of the third component of the 
democratic deficit. 
 
The hollow school? 
The way in which state and federal governments in Australia have sought to marketise 
the school system could be seen as an example of the third component of the 
democratic deficit. Rather than clarifying accountability lines, those who implement 
managerial and market practices into the public sector remove public goods and 
services from that sector and reduce citizens to customers. Ball (2009) has argued 
that, in the United Kingdom, education policy itself has, to some extent, been 
privatised.  
 
Blackmore (2004) makes the link between the marketisation of schools and the 
democratic deficit clear when she argues that: 
 
The language of the market and new managerialism positioned teachers as 
education providers, parents as clients and students as consumers. … Notions of 
professional judgement were put under stress by increased parental surveillance 
and increasingly prescriptive curriculum and assessment with the introduction 
of standardized assessment of literacy and numeracy in years 3 and 5. Finally, 
the new managerialism changed the social and political relations of work, with 
increased executive prerogative with the principal, increased competition within 
schools between teachers with performance management, reduced funding 
creating internal tensions between units, and increased reporting, monitoring, 
and surveillance under new regimes of managerial accountability (Blackmore, 
2004, p. 273). 
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Similarly, in the United Kingdom, school-based management has distanced 
headteachers from students and classroom learning, undermining them as educational 
leaders (McInerney, 2003). 
 
In a recent article on education policy in the United Kingdom, Ball (2009) argues that 
education and education policy have, in effect, been privatised. Privatisation has 
occurred in a number of ways. The first of these is the selling of continuing 
professional development, consultancies, training, and support directly to schools and 
universities. Here policy is being sold ‘as a retail commodity’ by private providers 
(Ball, 2009, p. 84). In the United Kingdom, these providers can make a profit in at 
least two ways. The first relates to government policies on underperformance such 
that these businesses sell school improvement. The second relates to ‘policy ideas, 
like “personalised learning”’ (Ball, 2009, p. 85). Similar changes have been occurring 
in the United States and amount to ‘“reculturing”’ (Fullan, 2001, in Ball, 2009, p. 86) 
in line with ‘business models of change management’ (Ball, 2009, p. 85. Emphasis in 
original) that involve managerial language and a self-belief.  
 
The second method of educational privatisation is ‘the privatisation of policy’ (Ball, 
2009, p. 88):  
 
where private education consultants produce policy ‘texts’ and policy ideas for 
and within the state; the export of ‘statework’ to private providers and 
‘agencies’; and the formulation and dissemination of new policy discourses 
arising out of the participation of these companies in report writing, evaluation, 
advice, consultancy and recommendations. In other words, the representatives 
of the private sector operate inside of government and are part of the ‘policy 
creation community’ (Ball, 2009, p. 89).  
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Thus education and consultancy businesses are now embedded in the networks of 
policy making and policy delivery. Ball (2009) uses PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to 
illustrate his points.  
 
The third aspect of the privatisation of education is related to globalisation and new 
markets. Examples here are Cambridge Education in the United States and Edison 
Schools UK in the United Kingdom. Here these schools/school districts sell services 
to other schools, districts, or countries.5 Ball (2009, p. 95) argues that ‘these kinds of 
activities entail both “policy entrepreneurship” and at the same time a process of 
policy transfer, and perhaps a mechanisms of “policy convergence”. The companies 
are delivering “development and aid policy” (for a potential profit), developing local 
policy infrastructures, and embedding prevailing western policy discourses, directly 
or as “spillovers” into the local policy systems, working with various “partners”’ 
(Ball, 2009, p. 95). This activity is, in essence, ‘a form of re-colonisation’ (Ball, 2009, 
p. 95).  
 
All three of these areas of privatisation amount to a re-drawing of the boundaries 
between the public sector and the private sector (Ball, 2009). Yet, education, like 
many other areas of the public sector, involves multiple and competing objectives. 
Managerial and market practices, then, ‘cannot be applied in a simple manner to 
education’ (Santizo Rodall and Martin, 2009, p. 328) as they are narrow and because 
the political is crucial to the public domain (Santizo Rodall and Martin, 2009).  
 
                                                 
5 For instance, Cambridge Education trains Beijing education inspectors. It works with governments in 
Thailand, California, New Orleans, and New York, as well as with the World Bank. 
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Continuing his work about the public domain, Ranson (2003) has mounted a strong 
case against the accountability and ‘performativity’ components of managerialism. 
Ranson (2003) argues that accountability in the public domain should contain a 
number of features, beginning with recognition that:  
 
corporate/contract accountability is inappropriate to the public sphere. The goods 
of effectiveness need to be subordinated to the internal goods of a service that can 
only be clarified through deliberation in the public sphere. …[There is a need to] 
reconstruct the governance of accountability as a democratic practice … [because] 
the public sphere is inescapably a political space because it is the space of 
collectivity … [thus] an alternative perspective of accountability begins by 
recognising this agonistic plurality and contestation at the centre of the public 
sphere (Ranson, 2003, p. 473).  
 
By implication, membership of the public domain is inclusive. Thus participation, 
equality of voice, dissent, and deliberation in order to reach a shared understanding 
are all important in the democratic public domain. Other features of this type of 
accountability are judgement and collective choice. Within a democratic system, 
deliberation leads to judgement and collective choice, which, in turn, leads to popular 
control and, hopefully, to the democratisation of social relations (Ranson, 2003). As 
Ranson (2003, p. 475) argues: 
 
accountability is a defining quality of the public sphere because it 
institutionalizes a discourse about purposes, practices, and performance. “It is a 
social and political process”. … Public accountability articulates a theory of 
political authority grounded in the consent of society. That authority resides 
with the public and is delegated to representatives and officials on condition that 
they, in turn, account to the public.  
 
Thus public accountability is about values such as inclusion and social justice. These 
values mean that it is essential that ‘the outcomes of schooling’ be ‘broaden’ (Mulford 
et al., 2008, p. 24) such that students’ ‘democratic knowledge, attitudes, values, and 
actions’ are valued and assessed (Mulford, et al., 2008, p. 41). The current managerial 
 27
regime has eroded trust and, ironically, distorted performance (Ranson, 2003). 
According to Ranson (2003, p. 476), communities need to ‘learn to recognize that 
their identities and futures depend…on committing themselves to the internal goods 
of improvement embedded in the institutional practices of democratic citizenship and 
governance’.    
 
While changes to the education system in Australia have, perhaps, not gone as far as 
those in the United Kingdom — and possibly for similar reasons as they did not go as 
far in the core public service in the 1990s where there was a stated belief in 
democratic principles — nevertheless, there has been a significant attempt to 
marketise schooling. Marketisation forces public schools into competition with each 
other, as well as with private schools. This drift was aided by the funding policies of 
the Howard federal government, which gave more support to Catholic and 
Independent schools, and intervened in state government responsibilities. 
Marketisation is most obvious in the policies surrounding school choice. Any move 
that recasts parents and children as the consumers of school suffers from a similar 
problem. Not every parent has the resources to choose.  
 
Marketisation is also apparent in the use of League Tables that have the potential to 
give a false impression of the schools that appear to be performing well and the 
schools that appear to be performing poorly (e.g., Smeed et al., 2009). This aspect of 
marketisation links back to the first component of the democratic deficit as these 
League Tables and the standardised tests that drive them are a means of ensuring the 
accountability of teachers. Yet such tests and League Tables might only produce 
student performance and teacher accountability related to completing tests on a 
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narrow range of tasks than on the full range of tasks and attributes required of 
citizens. Thus it is likely that schools will no longer be free, secular, and compulsory 
(Meadmore, 2001). Hence there has been a move to the third component of the 
democratic deficit in Australia, where critics have observed the privatisation of 
education. A privatised school is, in essence, a hollow school — education policy, 
practices, curriculum, and pedagogy are no longer the preserve of the state but are 
provided by private companies seeking to make a profit rather than seeking to develop 
the citizens of the future.   
 
Implications and Conclusion 
We have argued there has been a drift towards a democratic deficit in Australian 
schooling. First, through the use of school-based management, there has been a 
greater stress on a narrow view of accountability, at the expense of broader notions of 
accountability. Second, there has been consideration of performance pay and a greater 
use of performance measures in schools. These performance measures de-
professionalise teachers. Third, although not as extensive as in the United Kingdom, 
the direction of federal funding, the marketisation of schools, and the publication of 
League Tables, mark a trend to the third component of the democratic deficit.  
 
We concur with Mulford et al. (2008, p. 25) who observe that ‘[m]aintaining a model 
of accountability that is built on a restricted view of what is essential and how that is 
determined helps to perpetuate school inequality and social inequality’. A way 
forward suggested by Ranson is to reassert and reclaim the values of the public 
domain, particularly those of democratic citizenship, inclusion and social justice, in 
order to counter the impact of this deficit. For instance, it could be argued that 
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governments need to invest in ‘more trust in the teaching profession’ (Gleeson and 
Husbands, 2003, p.507). They need to ‘retrieve’ the ‘public domain that holds in 
check the incursions of the market … School development, teacher development, and 
teacher effectiveness depend on the exercise of imagination, on rigorous self-
evaluation and the involvement of the whole community’ (Gleeson and Husbands, 
2003, p. 509).  
 
Hargreaves (2000, pp. 169-175) has offered seven suggestions for teachers and school 
leaders to maintain and reassert their professionalism. The first suggestion, 
competitive salaries for all teachers, is perhaps one that no-one would dispute. But 
there appears, at least in Australia, to be a lack of will at the government level to 
pursue this proposal (Hargreaves, 2000).   
 
Second, counter the derision and blaming of teachers in which politicians and the 
media engage (Hargreaves, 2000). A culture of blame has caused a loss of faith by the 
public in teachers and education. Third, regulate those entering into the educational 
work of schools. Fourth, value and defend the ‘rigorous knowledge’ that comes with 
their education as teachers. Fifth, teachers must collaborate to improve ‘teaching, 
learning and caring in schools’. Sixth, teachers need to mount a convincing case for 
why they need time during the school day to collaborate. Seventh, ‘teachers must 
direct their collaborative efforts towards positive change not only within their own 
schools, but also with their colleagues elsewhere … [teachers need] to set and meet an 
exacting set of professional standards of practice’ (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 171, Italics 
in the original). 
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A final suggestion we would proffer is one that looks beyond contractual 
accountability towards more responsive approaches where teachers and leaders are 
central to decisions about making their schools successful so that a range of student 
interests and needs can be met (Mulford et al, 2008). The notion of accountability 
would be broadened so that teaching is not preoccupied with narrow tests scores of 
students but takes a wider perspective to ‘include evidence of student social success 
and empowerment’ (Print in Mulford et al., 2008, p.40). Such an approach recognises 
the moral purpose of teaching and education since students’ needs and interests would 
be driving school-based reforms. It also recognises that teachers and principals in 
concert can endeavour to ‘counter the excesses of managerialism and reassert their 
capacities to improve [their schools and] … themselves’ (Johnson, 2004, p.23). 
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